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Popular analyses of political discontent 
among young people converged on a 
global level after the advent of the eco-
nomic crisis in 2007-08. They have 
referred to pervasive alienation, frustra-
tion, disappointment, and fear, depicting 
a generation exploited by ruthless busi-
ness owners, neglected by policy elites, 
and abandoned by older generations. 
The analyses likewise share an under-
standing of the meaning of ‘youth’, 
namely a population defined by narrow-
ing economic opportunities under global 
market capitalism and subsequent pro-
test. This paper attempts to go beyond 
this conception to explore the emergence 
of a new framework for agency. More 
specifically, the paper aims to go beyond 
interpreting the behavior of ‘youth’ in the 
Arab World, especially among educated 
young men and women, as simply about 
protest. Instead, the paper posits that 
concurrent trends in privatization of pub-
lic services, increasing individual and 
local responsibility for social problems 
and job creation, job insecurity, and 
greater exposure to rights and govern-
ment accountability are influencing 
capacity to influence local change and 
likewise, challenging boundaries 
between social, political, and economic 
agency. Drawing on longstanding 
research on social activism in Morocco, 
the paper adapts the language of theo-
rists of generational formation and con-
sciousness (see Edmunds and Turner 
2002, 2005) to argue that the initial con-
sequence of market reform in the eighties 
and nineties was the formation of an 
‘interval generation’, disenfranchised 
economically and unrepresented politi-
cally. Over the past 5-10 years, though, 
the entrenchment of globalization and 
neoliberal ideology have led to the emer-
gence of an ‘active generation’ maneu-
vering to influence policy and liberal mar-
ket capitalism through altering local 
economic and social opportunities. This 
maneuvering is particularly apparent in 
the rise of social entrepreneurship, not 
just as an employment policy, but also as 
an indicator of how the boundaries 
between economic, political, and social 
agency at a local level have blurred.
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Introduction
Popular analyses of political discontent 
among young people converged on a 
global level after the advent of the eco-
nomic crisis in 2007-08. They have referred 
to pervasive alienation, frustration, disap-
pointment, and fear, depicting a genera-
tion (see Edmunds and Turner) exploited 
by ruthless business owners, neglected by 
policy elites, and abandoned by older 
generations. Looking for alternative politi-
cal ideas, they turn to right-wing (Bayer; 
Mondon and Bowman) or left-wing popu-
lism (Mounk), radical religious groups, or 
just to the streets, to protest. Writing for 
the South China Morning Post, Yonden 
Lahtoo criticizes property developers 
preying on the youth demographic by 
building shoebox-sized flats and mis-
marketing them as ‘trendy’ homes for 
the young, upcoming proletariat. Add 
other unsavory predators to the mix, 
such as businessmen renting out cu-
bicle sleeping spaces that resemble 
hyperbaric chambers, and you have 
a cesspool of greed and desperati-
on that is not just a blight on this city 
[Hong Kong], but on humanity itself. 
(November 17, 2016) 
Reports on protests in Russia, the United 
States, Europe, and the Arab World are 
strikingly similar, describing a newly mobi-
lized generation desirous of a more stable, 
promising future. A young man quoted in 
the New York Times commented that the 
unexpectedly high turnout among young 
people at the March 2017 anti-corruption 
protests in Russia was because young 
people “just want to live like normal, mod-
ern people in the rest of Europe” (Higgins 
and Kramer A1). An article on the left-lean-
ing American news site Salon challenged 
the criticism of the ‘millennials’ as lazy and 
over-protected and pointed out that, 
In 2015, millennials became the largest 
voting bloc in the nation, overtaking 
baby boomers. And, despite the hype, 
millennials are voting. Even more, they 
are protesting and organizing and ma-
king their voices heard ” (McClennen).1
The same references to suffering 
from decision-making or negligence 
amongst political elites and the grim 
future young people may face charac-
terize analyses of protest and alienati-
on in the Arab World. The 20 Fevrier 
movement in Morocco during 2011-
2012 was supposed to, as in Russia in 
2017 or Hong Kong in 2016, fight cor-
ruption and make the government 
more accountable, particularly for their 
future. As one journalist said of the de-
monstrations several years afterwards, 
During this period, most political 
parties were terrified of the youth’s 
rebellion, disobedience, and their 
strong insistence to speak out against 
inequality and injustice by manifes-
ting their claims and demands in the 
streets instead of with ink and paper 
(Igrouane).
In response, the Moroccan government 
did amend the constitution to protect the 
right of assembly and peaceful demon-
stration and the right to join trade unions 
and parties, but the practical exercise of 
these rights has remained legally ambigu-
ous (Madani et al 21). Thus, though more 
stable politically than other countries in 
the region, with its high unemployment 
(and most likely underemployment) rates 
among young people, declining public 
health and education services, and persis-
tent concentration of power in political 
elites, Morocco possesses a similar con-
text for disenfranchisement to other coun-
tries in the Arab World and elsewhere. 
Beyond the common characterization of 
this disenfranchisement, the analyses 
share a conceptual understanding of what 
‘youth’ is, namely a population defined by 
narrowing economic opportunities under 
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global market capitalism and subsequent 
protest. This paper attempts to go beyond 
a conception of youth as a passive con-
struct of international and national poli-
cies and economic ideology and trends 
(Sukarieh and Tannock; France and 
Threadgold) to explore the emergence of 
a new framework for agency. Though I am 
not an expert in youth studies, the paper 
develops upon a debate in the field con-
cerning the political economy of youth, 
namely on the relative importance of eco-
nomic (neoliberal) ideology and inequal-
ity to the identity and behavior of young 
people.  Sukarieh and Tannock describe 
this approach to the study of youth as con-
cerning “how (and whether) individuals 
and groups come to be constituted as 
‘youth’ in the first instance.” The analysis 
itself is of “the continuously changing 
nature and significance of youth as an 
identity, social category and ideology, in 
relation to the broader contexts of local, 
national and global culture, society, poli-
tics and economy” (1283). More specifi-
cally, the paper aims to go beyond inter-
preting the behavior of ‘youth’ in the Arab 
World, especially among educated young 
men and women, as simply about protest. 
Instead, the paper posits that concurrent 
trends in the privatization of public ser-
vices, increasing individual and local 
responsibility for social problems and job 
creation, job insecurity, and greater expo-
sure to rights and government account-
ability are influencing capacity to influ-
ence local change and, likewise, 
challenging boundaries between social, 
political, and economic agency. I suggest 
that the consequence has been to alter 
perceptions among young people as to 
how they can demonstrate their own 
power and achieve recognition. 
Drawing on longstanding research on 
social activism in Morocco, the paper 
adapts the language of theorists of gen-
erational formation and consciousness 
(see Edmunds and Turner) to argue that 
the initial consequence of market reform 
in the eighties and nineties was the forma-
tion of an ‘interval generation’, disenfran-
chised economically and unrepresented 
politically. Over the past 5-10 years, 
though, the entrenchment of globaliza-
tion and neoliberal ideology has led to 
the emergence of an ‘active generation’ 
maneuvering to influence policy and lib-
eral market capitalism through altering 
local economic and social opportunities. 
This maneuvering is particularly apparent 
in the rise of social entrepreneurship, not 
just as an employment policy, but also as 
an indicator of how the boundaries 
between economic, political, and social 
agency at a local level have blurred. In 
Morocco - with its longstanding embrace 
of entrepreneurship to counter unem-
ployment, political support for civil soci-
ety, and a policy of decentralization, 
accelerated since the constitutional 
reforms of 2011 - the ambition to instigate 
change at a local level and the blurring of 
boundaries between sectors may be 
more pronounced than in countries such 
as Jordan, where the public sector is more 
predominant.
The paper first discusses how theorists 
have situated ‘youth’ within historical con-
text, and then explores how analysis of 
generational change can reveal transfor-
mation in the meaning and practice of 
citizenship and suggest long-term eco-
nomic and political implications. 
Conceptualizing Moroccan ‘Youth’ in 
Historical Context
Distinguishing Generations Over Time 
Conceptualizing the agency of youth in 
relation to a particular political economic 
context differs from theories of genera-
tions, namely those originally developed 
by Karl Mannheim. The latter are rooted in 
demographics and the viability of a coher-
ent, cohesive perception of commonality 
and purpose shared across individuals 
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and groups of similar ages. Mannheim 
explains that 
Fundamental integrative attitudes and 
formative principles are all-important . 
. . in the handing down of every traditi-
on, firstly because they alone can bind 
groups together, secondly, and, what 
is perhaps even more important, they 
alone are really capable of becoming 
the basis of continuing practice” (305). 
Building upon Mannheim’s work, Eyerman 
and Turner define ‘generation’ as a
cohort of persons passing through 
time who come to share a common ha-
bitus, hexis, and culture, a function of 
which is to provide them with a collecti-
ve memory that serves to integrate the 
cohort over a finite period of time” (93). 
Drawing particularly from the experience 
of the Sixties, they add that generations 
are constituted by traumatic events, pro-
test against dominant cultures, competi-
tion for resources, collective memory 
enhanced by the valorization of particular 
physical spaces (i.e. Woodstock in the 
Sixties), and passage through specific eco-
nomic periods, such as the Great 
Depression or the more current Great 
Recession (96). 
This passage through specific economic 
periods resonates with the explanations 
cited above of youth protest and anger. 
Edmunds and Turner (“Global genera-
tions: social change in the twentieth cen-
tury”), in a later theorization of genera-
tions, propose considering generations 
in Marxist terms of ‘in itself’ and ‘for itself’. 
They argue that generations make the 
transition from being a ‘passive cohort’ to 
a ‘self-conscious cohort’ when they “are 
able to exploit resources (political/educa-
tional/economic) to innovate in cultural, 
intellectual or political spheres” (561). 
They write:
In our theory, resources, opportunity 
and strategic leadership combine to 
constitute active generations. Thus, in-
tergenerational change could be con-
ceptualized in principle as alternating 
between active and passive genera-
tions. An active generation that trans-
forms social and cultural life tends to 
be followed by a passive one that sim-
ply inherits the changes produced by 
its more successful predecessor (561). 
Following Mannheim as well as Bourdi-
eu, they portray generations in conflict 
over resources, as “an active generati-
on closes off potential advantages to 
successive generations.” 
Active generations can also “act strategi-
cally within a field to influence significantly 
the opportunities for collective action of 
future cohorts” (561). 
I suggest that social entrepreneurship in 
Morocco, though still highly limited, indi-
cates the shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ and 
with the latter motivation, or to alter, 
rather than close off, opportunities for 
future generations. 
Market Reform in Morocco and the 
Context for Generational Change
Situating analysis of generational change 
within a political economic context, young 
men and women in postcolonial Morocco 
arguably identified citizenship with social 
mobility within the nation-state. Job 
opportunities and the possibility of eco-
nomic security (owning a house and con-
sumer goods, the possibility of savings 
and/or a pension) were linked to public 
investment in a national society. Political 
participation focused on, whether in 
opposition to or in support of the govern-
ment and the monarchy, political ideology 
and party agendas. In the market reform 
period, ‘youth’ became associated with 
marginalization within economic global-
ization and the decline of the nation-state, 
and likewise pervasive political alienation 
and disaffection, as citizenship ceased to 
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have the economic implications of the 
postcolonial era. (Cohen “Alienation and 
Globalization in Morocco,” Searching for 
a Different Future).
However, market reform policies gener-
ated diverse forms of change, not just eco-
nomic but also in the public sphere and 
political and social activism. With market 
liberalization and, notably, more complex 
and wider relations with international 
funding bodies such as the World Bank, 
government became more decentralized, 
social development more associated with 
local initiative, and public administration 
more responsive to local input and feed-
back. The 2011 Constitution reinforced 
these trends, stating in the First Article, 
The territorial organization of the King-
dom is decentralized, founded on an 
advanced system of regionalization
and recognizing that 
The citizens [feminine] and citizens 
[masculine] have [disposent] the right 
to present petitions to the public pow-
ers (Constitute Project). 
Article 27 reinforces this point, stating, 
The citizens [feminine] and citizens 
[masculine] have the right of access to 
information held by the public admi-
nistration, the elected institutions and 
the organs [organismes] invested with 
missions of public service.
The Constitution also provides in Article 31 
for 
The State, the public establishments 
and the territorial collectivities to pro-
vide equal access to, among other ser-
vices, healthcare, education ‘of quality’, 
‘water and to a healthy environment’, 
and ‘lasting [durable] development’. 
 
On a practical level, despite criticism for a 
lack of vision of social justice and, likewise, 
instrumentalization of anti-poverty pro-
grams to maintain political and economic 
power2, social development policies initi-
ated under King Mohammed VI such as 
the Initiative Nationale de Developpement 
Humain3 have provided employment in 
social action4 and, importantly, normalized 
local activism, especially among young 
people, as an expression of citizenship 
(Cohen). The official description of INDH 
states that, 
This community project is a major 
advance in accordance with the par-
ticipatory and partnership approach 
to development. Proactive and multi-
dimensional, the INDH is based on a 
decentralized approach that promotes 
access to decision-making; illustrating 
a targeted policy and strongly rooted 
at local level.
It then describes one of the program’s 
benefits as 
Talking about the civil society evokes 
the Highest Royal Will to allow all Mo-
roccans (women and men) to partici-
pate individually and collectively in the 
development challenges (INDH).
The effect of greater political and policy 
attention to governance, government 
accountability, and civic activism, along-
side persistent unemployment rates, has 
been to broaden public debate concern-
ing political reform and on an individual 
level, integrate practical action into the 
meaning of citizenship, or beyond access 
to public services for individual gain. 
Indeed, King Hassan II introduced these 
new dimensions to the public sphere and 
citizenship when he spoke publically 
about the World Bank’s assessment of 
Morocco’s economic future in the early 
Nineties (Catusse; Lamlili; World Bank). In 
doing so, he instigated a break with 
Morocco’s economic model of endoge-
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nous growth and the severity of govern-
ment control over public information. The 
result was to associate external pressure 
for economic liberalization with political 
reform. Seemingly contradictory in his 
politics, a young journalist and prominent 
critic of the regime in the mid-Nineties 
told me once, “The World Bank is enforc-
ing accountability.” His hope was that the 
Bank’s interventions would increase trans-
parency in economic activity, especially 
among political and business elites. 
Discussing the availability of information 
in Morocco, the director of an interna-
tional NGO called Hassan II’s recognition 
of World Bank economic concerns in 1993 
a ‘watershed’ moment, when dissemina-
tion of information about policymaking 
and public institutions began to evolve 
into a public right. 
As public institutions have come under 
pressure in subsequent decades to 
become more responsive to citizens, the 
promotion of local civic activism and push 
toward private sector employment have 
integrated social change with participa-
tion in the global market economy. Rather 
than join political parties or movements, 
as in the post-colonial period, political 
expression among young people who 
have grown up under market reform is 
now interrelated with challenging the 
organizational forms and values that sus-
tain market capitalism. Though arguably 
young people have retreated from directly 
challenging the regime (Engelcke, 
Desrues), this does not preclude other 
forms of political activism aimed at trans-
forming social and economic structures. 
Investigating a Generational Shift
The Formation of an Interval Generation
From the eighties onwards, young people 
leaving lycée, university, or vocational 
school encountered the effects of struc-
tural adjustment and market reform mea-
sures, which sharply decreased their 
employment, and life, opportunities. They 
became an ‘interval generation’, caught 
between the decline of an identification 
of life chances with the nation-state, the 
ambiguity and insecurity of globalization, 
the inaccessibility of political power, and 
limitations on freedom of expression. 
Analyses of the Arab Spring in particular 
have highlighted the loss of social belong-
ing engendered by unemployment and 
lack of capacity to alter the future.  A chap-
ter in a 2014 World Bank report on youth 
unemployment in Tunisia leads with a 
quote on the existential meaning of a job 
from an unemployed young man from 
Sidi Bouzid, where the Arab Spring 
began: 
For us, unemployment is a kind of blas-
phemy; an unemployed is not a per-
son, society itself does not accept him, 
he is not part of the circle of society. 
That is the true meaning of “unemplo-
yed”:  a person who is not active in the 
heart of the society. Tell me, what use is 
that person? (24)
Speaking at a special session of 
the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) governing body in 2011, Dorothea 
Schmidt, a senior specialist in unemploy-
ment at the ILO, explained that low wages, 
lack of social protection and contractual 
security, and subsequent distrust in the 
possibility of social mobility have had a 
predictable effect on confidence in politi-
cal institutions and politicians. In a press 
release for the meeting, she is quoted as 
saying, “it is no wonder that many young 
people are angry” (ILO).
Despite the recognition of political conse-
quences of unemployment and economic 
insecurity, policy responses have focused 
largely on strengthening the connection 
between skill development, particularly at 
the level of post-baccalaureate education 
and vocational training, and job market 
supply. A few policy recommendations 
have pushed for minor changes, such as 
making information about openings more 
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accessible and the introduction of unem-
ployment insurance, which Morocco 
implemented in 2014, though targeted at 
those with employment experience rather 
than new jobseekers.5 The dominant nar-
rative of job creation, however, is reflected 
in King Mohammed VI’s Discours Royal in 
August 2014: 
To develop qualified human resources 
is a major priority for enhancing com-
petition and responding as well to the 
requirements of development and the 
job market and should complement 
the advancement and diversification of 
the national economy.
The reduction of job creation to cultivating 
human resources neglects both the exis-
tential importance of a job conveyed 
explicitly in the World Bank Report and 
how particular jobs become important 
existentially. More importantly, it misses 
the emergence of alternative forms of 
political expression facilitated by other 
policy strategies and programs, as well as 
the globalization of the economy. These 
trends have potentially led to the forma-
tion of a new, in Edmunds and Turner’s 
perspective, ‘active’ generation that blurs 
the boundaries between citizenship and 
economic opportunity. This shift ironically 
echoes the substance of post-national 
social contracts, where social mobility and 
citizenship intersected, but the underlying 
rationale for this relation is not to stabilize 
and legitimize the nation-state. Rather, the 
blurred boundaries reflect the nation-
state’s decline and both the general void 
left for developing new frameworks of 
political activism and the specific conse-
quences of devolution policies and the 
normalization of civic engagement for at 
least perceived capacity to instigate 
change at a local level. 
The Symbolic Importance of Social 
Entrepreneurship 
To investigate generational change today, 
I suggest looking at social entrepreneur-
ship, not as a policy strategy to create jobs 
or address poverty, but rather as an indica-
tion of how the individual would-be entre-
preneurs at a local level distinguish pos-
sibilities for individual agency. The term 
‘social enterprise’ itself is ambiguous and 
atemporal, perhaps enhancing its value in 
development policy. Dacin and Tracey dis-
tinguish social entrepreneurship by its 
mission: “creating social value by provid-
ing solutions to social problems” (Dacin 
and Tracey 1204). Martin and Osberg 
adopt their definition from Schumpeter, 
substituting social aims for profitmaking 
while engaging in the same entrepreneur-
ial pursuit of new ideas that renders obso-
lete other methods. 
In Morocco, King Hassan II’s statement in 
1988 during the opening session of 
Parliament reinforced the importance of 
entrepreneurism as a political economic 
strategy:
Moroccans are entrepreneurial and 
very often aspire to become, at their 
own scale, entrepreneurs. We now 
have to encourage such aspirations, it 
should not be that potential entrepre-
neurs feel confined within an economy 
where they are barred access due eit-
her to the concentration of private ca-
pital or public enterprises.
The late King added that the goal was to 
create the conditions for new entrepre-
neurs to take risks and assume responsi-
bility so that they could become agents in 
economic development (Catusse 52). 
Political support for entrepreneurism led 
to the creation of the oft-criticized (La Vie 
Eco “Crédit Jeunes Promoteurs”) program 
of Jeunes Promoteurs (L’Economiste) and 
other, more recent efforts. For instance, 
the World Bank has recently invested $50 
million in support for start-ups,6 with the 
aim, as stated by the Maghreb Director 
Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly, to ease 
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“access to opportunities for entrepre-
neurs” because entrepreneurship “is the 
path to an inclusive growth that is benefi-
cial to all Moroccans” (World Bank “Small 
enterprises”).
Undoubtedly, entrepreneurship has come 
to function as a policy alternative for pub-
lic sector job creation. A baseline report 
on youth unemployment produced by the 
organization S4YE (Solutions for Youth 
Employment) and funded by the World 
Bank highlights the expectation that entre-
preneurism can decrease unemployment 
rates, especially among young, educated 
Moroccans. In the press release announc-
ing the report, the S4YE Coalition 
Manager, Matt Hobson, remarks, 
The report shows that young people 
are by inclination more entrepreneurial 
than adults - and we now know that of 
all the interventions governments, pri-
vate sector and civil society implement 
to address youth employment, provi-
ding support to early entrepreneurs is 
the most effective (World Bank “Youth 
unemployment”). 
The report itself concludes that entrepre-
neurship reflects initiative, ambition, and 
desire for independence from economic 
forces:  (S4YE 2015, 58). Analyses of social 
entrepreneurship (Martin and Osberg; 
Dacin and Tracey; Eppler, Kerlin) also 
associate entrepreneurial initiative with 
youth and the desire to help ‘their com-
munities’. 
Dart writes that, 
As business becomes a more pree-
minent organizational model and as 
increasingly wide swaths of human so-
ciety become conceptualized as mar-
kets, then the businesslike hybrid face 
of social enterprise is legitimate and in 
fact responsive to the times (421). 
In Morocco, The World Bank, in partner-
ship with the British Council, has sup-
ported social entrepreneurship to gener-
ate economic opportunity and to foster 
responses to local problems. Their pro-
gram, launched in 2015, consisted of a 
boot camp entitled ‘Provision of 
Employment and Inclusion Services for 
Youth in Morocco’ for social entrepreneurs 
that included training for 30 social entre-
preneurs and $10,000 in financing for 10 
social enterprises selected through com-
petition. The British Council launched a 
second program in 2016, Social 
EntrepreNorth, which is directed at sup-
porting social enterprise in Northern 
Morocco. Like its predecessor, this pro-
gram is intended to “develop locally-
owned, innovative solutions to social and 
economic challenges,” and specifically, “to 
train a team of social enterprise trainers 
and help students gain the skills to secure 
employment or start their own social 
enterprises.” Another aim is to develop 
better relations with local government so 
that they become “more responsive to 
youth needs, improve service delivery, 
and support social enterprise (British 
Council).”
 
Examples of social enterprises7 include 
Sanady,8 founded in 2006, which provides 
educational support through teacher 
training, after-hours classes, and school 
refurbishment to children in multiple cities 
in Morocco. Other, newer social enter-
prises like Tamkeen9 in Tangiers run edu-
cational workshops to encourage creativ-
ity.  Looly’s and Al-Ikram (Media24 “La 
première entreprise sociale”) provide 
employment to low-income groups 
through the manufacture of food products 
or crafts or facilitate market access for 
small local businesses through online plat-
forms (e.g. Anarouz).
The growing prominence of social entre-
preneurship (The Guardian), as perhaps 
youth entrepreneurship in general, does 
not preclude its high failure rate. Adnane 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
53meta
Addioui, the director of MCISE, an organi-
zation that supports the incubation of 
social enterprises, told me that of approx-
imately 2000 expressions of interest over 
the past several years, only 78 were estab-
lished an only 20 of these have survived 
(Doane; Cohen Personal Conversation). 
Of the 30 participants in the British 
Council-World Bank project, and the 10 
that received financial support, allegedly 
only two are still functioning. In his analysis 
of social entrepreneurship in Morocco, 
Faouzi notes that the impact of social 
enterprise remains minimal, referring in 
particular to the inefficiency of coopera-
tives (there are approximately 12,000 in 
Morocco, according to him, with about 
450,000 members). Angel-Urdinola con-
curs in his own analysis, stating that busi-
nesses that serve marginalized popula-
tions are ‘rare’ in Morocco (World Bank 
Blogs), while a British Council report states 
that in Morocco, “Awareness of social 
enterprise is considered to be extremely 
low” (Angel-Urdinola 6, World Bank). The 
same British Council report on social 
enterprise in Morocco remarks:
It is clear that the social enterprise mo-
vement is being driven by a relatively 
small circle of people; this circle of 
people share common characteristics – 
notably, graduates of higher education 
and exposure to international ideas 
and experiences on social enterprise 
– which have clearly influenced their 
thinking on social enterprise develop-
ment in Morocco. 
In other words, only those able to connect 
to international organizations and sources 
of capital can lead national efforts to pro-
mote social entrepreneurship. 
At the same time, though the impact of 
social enterprises is still essentially 
unknown, as the majority are relatively 
new. The evaluations of older initiatives 
indicate steady growth in networks, proj-
ects, and funding sources, as well as effec-
tive use of services. Sanady’s 2014-15 
report (Sanady Rapport 2015) states that 
in a national survey of more than 1700 
pupils, 980 parents, and 141 teachers, 97% 
of the pupils claimed their academic 
results had improved, whereas 95% of the 
teachers stated that they were very satis-
fied with their working conditions and 
99% felt that their efforts were valued. A 
somewhat lower percentage, 73%, of the 
parents expressed satisfaction with their 
children’s education. Overall, in 2015, the 
foundation provided educational pro-
grams to 4100 pupils and partnered with 
38 companies. The number of pupils was 
more than double the figure cited in the 
2011-2012 report, or 1905 pupils, while the 
number of partner companies was 25 
(Sanady Rapport 2011-2012).
Local social enterprise has greater impli-
cations, though, than employment or even 
the delivery of a service. It indicates a 
desire for autonomy and freedom, real-
ized through constructing community, or 
building social solidarity across different 
socio-economic groups. The S4YE report 
generalizes the behavior and attitudes of 
young people to undergird policy objec-
tives, but the rhetoric also notes the wish 
for ‘control’.  This control is identified with 
initiative and engagement across social 
and sometimes ethnic and religious diver-
sity (Murphy and Coombes). Addioui 
remarked that very few of the young entre-
preneurs that contacted him were from 
Rabat or Casablanca and were not neces-
sarily Francophone. They were also often 
not from families with means, and despite 
the anxiety and fear of their parents, who 
needed reliable income, assumed the risk 
of launching an enterprise. 
Social enterprise requires linking global 
movement of capital, goods, and ideas, 
social media, and local social change. 
Without financial support in Morocco, 
social entrepreneurs have to turn to inter-
national foundations like Drosos and 
national or international competitions 
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launched by agencies like the World Bank 
and the British Council, organizations like 
Seedstars,10 and companies like Orange.11 
They can also access crowdfunding 
through online platforms like Kickstarter. 
Beyond the practical implications of set-
ting up an enterprise, I suggest that the 
interrelation between economic opportu-
nity, political expression, and social status 
indicates the possible formation of a dif-
ferent generation than the one marginal-
ized by the decline of the public sector 
and political disinterest. In interviews, 
experienced social activists in Morocco 
consistently noted the shift in interest 
among young people, regardless of loca-
tion, in connecting economic opportunity 
to local social change and, implicitly or 
explicitly, political engagement. They 
remarked frequently in recent conversa-
tions (Summer 2017) that younger activists 
have different expectations than their 
older counterparts. For instance, the pro-
gram director of a well-established 
Moroccan organization noted in an inter-
view that young people view leaders in 
the sector as ‘opportunistic’ and ‘corrupt’, 
seeking to reinforce personal status and 
networks through social action. These 
leaders have also possessed the indepen-
dent resources to engage in social activ-
ism as a vocation, whereas younger activ-
ists have required employment. Unlike 
their older colleagues as well, they con-
centrate on immediate local issues, or at 
commune or even neighborhood level, 
rejecting the national scope of older 
organizations.  They are engaged in local 
politics, the program director com-
mented, even if they feel distant from 
national affairs. 
A much younger social activist, who had 
worked with a number of social enter-
prises in Rabat and Casablanca, reiterated 
the distance and suspicion her generation 
felt toward leaders in social action and civil 
society in Morocco. “The older generation 
thinks in terms of charity,” she said. She 
also criticized how the ‘older generation’ 
based in the ‘North’ (Casablanca and 
Rabat) lack contact with local residents, 
who were suspicious of externally driven 
projects. She preferred a “more straight-
forward method, or talking directly 
through roundtables” to generate “trust 
with people on the ground.”
Conclusion: The Implications for the Youth 
of the Future
The preeminence of local social action in 
the description and practice of social 
enterprise upends Zygmunt Bauman’s 
fears that “being local in a globalized 
world is a sign of social deprivation and 
degradation” and that “[L]ocalities are los-
ing their meaning-generating and mean-
ing-negotiating capacity and are increas-
ingly dependent on sense-giving and 
interpreting actions which they do not 
control”  (Bauman 12). Instead, social 
enterprise makes transforming the local 
context an avenue for accessing and even 
influencing globalization.  
This paper suggests that social enterprise 
reflects a generational shift, where, echo-
ing the postcolonial social contract, eco-
nomic security has become reconnected 
to citizenship. Today, however, citizenship 
is constituted differently from belonging 
to the nation-state and the expectation 
that the opportunity for social mobility will 
legitimize political authority. Instead, citi-
zenship among young people in particular 
often bypasses the national government 
as an object of reform, allegiance, or con-
testation, targeting instead the more 
immediate transformation of local condi-
tions through the utilization and alteration 
of market mechanisms and pressure on 
local government. National programs like 
INDH or the limited resources for social 
entrepreneurship provide an opportunity 
for individual activism and maneuvering 
for local political influence, where citizen-
ship becomes associated with social inter-
vention. Though still emerging as a social 
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process, the effect may be to force the 
question of if and how this new genera-
tion’s efforts will be recognized and 
whether or not the blurred boundaries 
between economic, political, and social 
agency will, in turn, challenge the divisions 
between public and private sector and 
charity and collective benefit.
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only of themselves, and not 
other citizens or even their 
heirs. 
2 Zemni and Bogaert argue 
that with INDH, “The logic 
of participation has become 
a matter of linking state 
institutions with ‘non-
state’ experts, NGOs and 
other social and economic 
partners. This technocratic 
approach to development 
evacuates to a large extent 
the possibility of politics as 
conflict is translated into a 
development target that 
has a solution based on 
certain kinds of expertise and 
knowledge.” (412). 






shtml for a few figures. 
5 La loi no 03-14 complétant 
et modifiant le dahir no 1-72-
184
6 The webpage describes 
the project as having “three 
components. 1) The first 
component, Financing 
Program, will target the 
following funding categories: 
angel/seed, early-stage, and 
VC stage. It has the following 
subcomponents: (i) Angel/
Seed financing(s); and (ii) 
Early stage/VC fund(s). 2) 
The second component, 
Ecosystem Support, will 
support organizations 
within the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem in the project area 
to stimulate new innovative 
enterprises. It has the 
following subcomponents: 
(i) Pre-seed Grants; 
(ii) Soft Loans; and (iii) 
Entrepreneurship Support. 
3) The third component, 
Project Management, 
Coordination, and 
Monitoring and Evaluation, 
will fund the Project 
Management Unit (PMU) 
and all of its incremental 
eligible operational and 
administrative costs for the 
management and supervision 
of the project over the 




org/nos-startups/ for a list 
supported by MCISE. 
Notes
1 The Brexit vote in the UK 
highlighted intergenerational 
tensions and anxiety about 
the future among young 
people. Letters to the 
newspaper The Guardian 
(June 24, 2016) from 
teenagers spoke of outrage, 
disgust, exclusion, and a 
dimming future. One writer 
stated, “Mostly I am outraged 
that this decision, which 
reflects on the British people, 
has been made without my 
consent. The future already 
looks less bright for us and it 
is a future I did not have a say 
in shaping.” Another blamed 
older people who voted for 
a political and policy rupture 
that would most likely never 
affect them and called the 
vote a betrayal of her future: 
“One thing that upsets me 
most is that this decision 
has been made by people 
who will not have to live 
with the consequences for 
as long as us. Young people 
voted to remain and older 
people voted to leave. I feel 
that I have been let down 
by an older generation who 
won’t be affected by the 
volatility of this decisions.” 
Those who would remain 
largely unaffected or benefit 
financially from leaving the 
European Union had thought 
8 See http://www.sanady.org/
home/
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